Prof. Chisako Masuo’s research on China’s fishing-fleet mobilisation — work our analysis supported — was honoured in Japan’s I-House journalism awards.

Taiwan's coast guard logged more Chinese government ships in its waters last month than in any month on record. Pressure has stopped being episodic.

Two vessels with documented maritime-militia training histories were present when the cable to Taiwan's outer islands went down. Not a coincidence.

China's East China Sea fishing ban has lifted and Japan is watching the fleet, not the catch. When the same hulls train, the season opens an operation.

Fewer aircraft, more maritime coercion. China's new normal around Taiwan is not de-escalation — it is a switch to the quieter instrument of pressure: China’s Maritime Militia. Moreover, the question was never whether the PLA has enough hulls. It is whether it can move, sustain and conceal a campaign in several places at once.

Fewer aircraft, more maritime coercion. China's new normal around Taiwan is not de-escalation — it is a switch to the quieter instrument of pressure.

China's coast guard operates as an instrument of state power, not law enforcement. The manoeuvre east of Taiwan was aimed at Washington's allies too.

China’s Coast Guard Is More Than a Police Force. It’s an Instrument of Power.

A #PRC Chinese Coast Guard vessel is maneuvering near #ScarboroughReef in the #SouthChina#Sea. Beijing's recent activities in the region are causing continued tensions.

Jason Wang and Marvin Bernardo on Sea Control 606, unpacking our Naval War College report: the PLA practiced landing in three places at once.

The invasion debate fixates on amphibious lift. The exercises point elsewhere: moving, sustaining and concealing a campaign across multiple locations.

On this episode of #SeaControl, I host Jason Wang and Marvin Bernardo to discuss their report, “Everything Everywhere All At Once: The Growing Complexity of PLA #Amphibious Exercises,” published by the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (#CMSI).

A fishing captain told Asahi's reporters he is a militiaman. Analysts put the maritime militia at 200,000–300,000. China’s ambiguity is irregular warfare

They said the quiet part out loud; we tracked what they did. AIS and imagery behind the maritime wall — how a line of boats becomes a barrier, and why it recurs.

The PLA landed in three places at once during its annual Amphibious Warfare Capstone Exercises, roughly 360 km apart — about Taipei to Kaohsiung — against obstacles matching Taiwan's coast. A rehearsal.

600+ vessels in coordinated East China Sea formations, buoys in the Yellow Sea, sustained South China Sea patrols. A decade of coercion below threshold.

China's irregular war at sea is not improvised. It is rehearsed, scored and repeated until the window for a proportionate response closes on its own.

You cannot deter what you cannot see. Countering an invasion of Taiwan can only be stopped if you can see the signals - Taiwan still needs to contribute to the Allied Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance architecture not just rely on it.

About 200 Chinese fishing boats—part of China’s state-directed maritime fleet—recently pushed further east in the Yellow Sea. Some came within 150 miles of the Japanese city of Sasebo, home to a core U.S. naval base, according to ship-tracking data provided by geospatial analysis firm ingeniSPACE and verified by The Wall Street Journal.

Years of drills near Taiwan simulated blockade and landing. The recent round reads differently — less signaling, more rehearsals, more taking and holding.

Like Christmas Day, we woke to find a surprise - our work was being covered by a Youtuber.

Consider the following How much of China's Irregular Warfare can be seen by conventional vessel tracking ? The fleet that matters is often the one not transmitting.