To the outside world, Hengli—which in Chinese means “eternal strength”—may not ring a bell. But inside China, it has become an industrial juggernaut. With operations spanning petrochemicals, textiles and shipbuilding, it employs more than 300,000 people and records revenue north of $100 billion a year—more than Tesla or Boeing—according to the company’s website.

It has also become a major importer of illicit Iranian crude, according to industry analysts, shipping brokers and the U.S. Treasury, which sanctioned the company’s refinery business earlier this year, saying it bought billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian petroleum. Hengli’s other businesses weren’t sanctioned. 

U.S. officials say Hengli is one of the biggest players in a vast ecosystem of “teapot” refineries in China that for years have been buying sanctioned oil.

On August 6, Chinese state media broadcast extensive coverage of a new offshore wind turbine, the “Haiyou Anlan” (海油安澜号), that had entered operation (YouTube/CCTV; Xinhua; Global Times; Lianhe Zaobao, August 6). The coverage framed the turbine, which belongs to the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC; 中国海洋石油总公司), as another win in Beijing’s push for technological and clean energy breakthroughs. One interview describes it as an important achievement under the 15th Five-Year Plan for key offshore wind turbine construction projects, and part of the Chinese state’s vision of itself as a “maritime power” (海洋强国) and an “energy power” (能源强国) (Fengkou, August 6).

The coverage uniformly neglected to mention one crucial detail: the Haiyou Anlan wind turbine has been installed in Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This is not the first time the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has built permanent structures in Taiwan’s waters. In September 2025, the geospatial intelligence firm ingeniSPACE identified a number of PRC oil and gas structures in Taiwan’s EEZ (China Brief, September 2, 2025). ingeniSPACE has now identified the addition of the wind turbine with the assistance of All Source Analysis.

For years, the public debate over a possible Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan has focused on a single question: Does the People’s Liberation Army have sufficient amphibious lift to move an invasion force across the Taiwan Strait? That question remains important. However, recent Chinese exercises suggest that the People’s Liberation Army is not simply trying to solve the problem of getting forces onto a Taiwanese beach. It is rehearsing how to move, sustain, and conceal a large amphibious campaign across multiple locations.

Con todo, la presencia china al este de Taiwán ya había comenzado a principios de mayo y se mantuvo «constante» incluso tras la conclusión de la citada «operación especial» de Pekín, asegura Jason Wang, director de operaciones de ingeniSPACE, una firma de inteligencia geoespacial con sede en Silicon Valley.

Un análisis elaborado por esta empresa a partir de datos satelitales y de los sistemas de identificación automática (AIS) revela que, entre el 1 y el 8 de junio, los buques de la CCG navegaron por una amplia zona al este de Taiwán, desde las inmediaciones de su costa oriental hasta bien entrada la zona económica exclusiva reclamada por Taipéi.

It was revealed on the 28th that multiple China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels began making routine voyages in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) south of Yonaguni Island, Okinawa Prefecture, in June, and commenced escorting Chinese marine research vessels and government ships. The Japanese government has also confirmed this activity. Although China has long claimed "jurisdiction" over this area—located east of Taiwan—the actual exercise of such authority is highly unusual. This move clearly signals opposition to the fact that Japan and the Philippines have designated this same area as a subject for maritime boundary delimitation negotiations.

中国海警局の複数の艦船が6月、沖縄県・与那国島南方の日本の排他的経済水域（EEZ）での航行を常態化させ、中国の海洋調査船と公船の護衛を始めたことが28日、分かった。日本政府もこの動きを確認した。この海域は台湾の東方で、中国は「管轄権」を主張してきたが、実際に権限を行使するのは極めて異例だ。同じ海域を日本とフィリピンが境界画定交渉の対象としたのに対抗する姿勢を鮮明にした。

Warum machen sich mehr als tausend chinesische Fischerboote auf den Weg und versammeln sich in Formation im Ostchinesischen Meer – und bleiben dort viele Stunden lang in geraden Linien? Solche Aktivitäten chinesischer Fischerboote sind seit einiger Zeit öfter zu beobachten.

Wir sprachen darüber mit Jason Wang, Chief Operating Officer bei IngeniSPACE, einem internationalen Dienstleistungsunternehmen für Geospatial Intelligence, für "raumbezogene Aufklärung" über ungewöhnliche maritime Aktivitäten chinesischer Fischerboote im Ostchinesischen Meer Ende vergangenen Jahres, über Chinas maritime Miliz, Dual-use-Schiffe und irreguläre Kriegsführung der Volksbefreiungsarmee Chinas.

TRANSLATION: Why did a thousand Chinese fishing boats set out and gather in formation in the East China Sea and remain there for hours?

China’s Coast Guard Is More Than a Police Force. It’s an Instrument of Power.

A #PRC Chinese Coast Guard vessel is maneuvering near #ScarboroughReef in the #SouthChina#Sea. Beijing's recent activities in the region are causing continued tensions.

For years, the public debate over a possible Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan has focused on a single question: Does the People’s Liberation Army have sufficient amphibious lift to move an invasion force across the Taiwan Strait? That question remains important. However, recent Chinese exercises suggest that the People’s Liberation Army is not simply trying to solve the problem of getting forces onto a Taiwanese beach. It is rehearsing how to move, sustain, and conceal a large amphibious campaign across multiple locations.

According to AIS data, the research vessel Zhong Shan Da Xue sailed through the South China Sea from May to June 2025. However, Sun Yat-sen University declared that the vessel was active in the South China Sea in August 2025, which contradicts the AIS data. The announcement stated that Sun Yat-sen University had conducted sea-trials of Haiqin, a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) capable of operating at depths of up to 6,000 meters, and that Zhong Shan Da Xue had deployed the Haidou-1 autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) at the same time. This marked the first scientific survey conducted by coordinating two different unmanned vehicles via a single support ship¹⁴.

On this episode of #SeaControl, I host Jason Wang and Marvin Bernardo to discuss their report, “Everything Everywhere All At Once: The Growing Complexity of PLA #Amphibious Exercises,” published by the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (#CMSI).

Dezember 2025, Januar und März 2026: Hunderte chinesische Fischerboote reihen sich in Linien im Ostchinesischen Meer auf. Vieles spricht dafür, dass sie dort nicht fischen. Wir machen uns auf die Suche: Was haben sie dort gemacht - und hatte Chinas geheimnisvolle Fischermiliz etwas damit zu tun? rabbit hole hilft dir, Desinformation und KI-Fakes in deinem Feed zu durchschauen. Damit du schneller erkennst, was stimmt und was nicht. Denn zwischen viralen Clips, halben Wahrheiten und KI-Fakes wird es immer schwieriger, den Überblick zu behalten. Genau da setzt rabbit hole an. Dreimal im Monat auf unserem Kanal. @tagesschau

December 2025, January and March 2026: Hundreds of Chinese fishing boats line up in the East China Sea. There is strong evidence suggesting they aren't actually fishing there. We set out to investigate: What were they doing there—and did China’s mysterious fishing militia play a role? Rabbit hole helps you see through disinformation and AI-generated fakes in your feed, enabling you to quickly distinguish fact from fiction. After all, amidst viral clips, half-truths, and AI fakes, it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep track of what’s real. That’s exactly where rabbit hole comes in. Catch it three times a month on our channel. @tagesschau

Masahiro Yumino, a former Foreign Ministry analyst specializing in Chinese militias, says China maintains a “national defense mobilization” system that broadly incorporates citizens and resources.

Yumino said local People’s Armed Forces Departments oversee the maritime militia.

The Chinese government reported 8 million militia personnel nationwide in 2011. They have been deployed for public security in urban and rural areas, as well as disaster relief.

Yumino estimates the maritime militia component alone holds 200,000 to 300,000 members.

Their missions include deployment to disputed areas while posing as ordinary fishing vessels, coordination with Chinese coast guard ships, and obstruction or intimidation of foreign vessels.

It is believed that maritime militia members are sometimes ordered to collide with other ships.

Jason Wang, chief operating officer of the U.S.-based geospatial intelligence firm ingeniSPACE, which identified the post-December 2025 “wall” activities, said the maritime militia conducts intelligence gathering and patrols, serving as the “eyes and ears” of the Chinese military.

The “walls” of thousands of fishing vessels could block commercial shipping and effectively close sea lanes, he said.

“Activities of the Chinese maritime militia target not just Taiwan but also commercial shipping to Japan and South Korea,” Wang said.

These forces are trained for maritime interdiction and armed conflict scenarios, and could disrupt routes used by oil, LNG tankers and container ships.

Communist Party Oath on a PAF-MM Ship: “我志愿加入中国共产党，调护觉的纲领，遵守党的章理，履行美员火分。执行党的决定，严守党的经售，影9金 的秘密，对觉出说，现败工作为去产主火奋斗終身，随财准過方党和人民間性一切，永不频算，

“China prefers ‘invisible hybrid warfare’ (隐形混合战) over kinetic warfare.  Covert irregular warfare enables China the means to quietly overwhelm its targets not only physically but economically and politically as well – all without firing a shot.  The use of civilian fishing vessels not only provide plausible deniability but legitimizes China’s claims and salami-slicing tactics as lawful and just.”

Main Findings

• In August 2025, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted a large-scale exercise to simulate an invasion of Taiwan. This “capstone” amphibious exercise suggests that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) training and preparations for a future Taiwan campaign are becoming more focused, realistic, and sophisticated.

• The exercise consolidated elements from previous years into a single simulated operation. It integrated a floating causeway system, anti-landing barriers and obstacles, and amphibious Landing Craft Tank (LCT) vessels that landed forces directly onto beachheads.

• For the first time observed, the PLA conducted a phased exercise with simultaneous amphibious landings in three distinct locations. Exercise areas incorporated civilian aquaculture obstacles like those expected to be found along Taiwan’s coastline, increasing environmental and tactical realism.

• The exercise occurred at simulated “landing locations” opposite Taiwan, particularly within the Zhangzhou-Xiamen-Quanzhou littoral zone. The locations were distributed at distance intervals comparable to likely wartime beachheads along Taiwan’s western coastline. The total distance between discrete exercise locations was approximately 360 kilometers, roughly the distance between Taipei and Kaohsiung.

• Not merely hypothetical in nature, the exercise reflected a specific geographical and operational focus. It appears to be part of a larger trend whereby the PLA is mapping its exercises onto analogous geography that reflects envisioned targets.

• Future research should explore the potential applications and implications of PLA efforts to train with similar distances and geometries as would be found in prospective conflict zones.

• Starting this summer, observers should scrutinize future capstone amphibious exercises to better understand the PLA’s strengths, weaknesses, and underlying operational assumptions.

For over a decade, the Chinese Communist Party has deployed “fishing fleets” and coast guard vessels as tools of coercion, blurring the line between civilian and military activity to expand its control across the Indo-Pacific. In the East China Sea, more than 600 Chinese vessels formed coordinated lines for hours at a time. In the Yellow Sea, China installed large aquaculture cages and a network of surveillance buoys in contested waters with South Korea. And in the South China Sea, China has surged coast guard patrols around Scarborough Shoal while constructing new artificial outposts at reefs near Vietnam complete with jetties, helipads, and potential runways. This is not routine commerce, it's gray zone warfare designed to intimidate U.S. allies, restrict access to international waters, and normalize China’s unlawful territorial claims. The U.S. and its partners must respond with urgency, strengthening maritime domain awareness, supporting frontline allies, and defending freedom of navigation.