Warum machen sich mehr als tausend chinesische Fischerboote auf den Weg und versammeln sich in Formation im Ostchinesischen Meer – und bleiben dort viele Stunden lang in geraden Linien? Solche Aktivitäten chinesischer Fischerboote sind seit einiger Zeit öfter zu beobachten.

Wir sprachen darüber mit Jason Wang, Chief Operating Officer bei IngeniSPACE, einem internationalen Dienstleistungsunternehmen für Geospatial Intelligence, für "raumbezogene Aufklärung" über ungewöhnliche maritime Aktivitäten chinesischer Fischerboote im Ostchinesischen Meer Ende vergangenen Jahres, über Chinas maritime Miliz, Dual-use-Schiffe und irreguläre Kriegsführung der Volksbefreiungsarmee Chinas.

TRANSLATION: Why did a thousand Chinese fishing boats set out and gather in formation in the East China Sea and remain there for hours?

Dezember 2025, Januar und März 2026: Hunderte chinesische Fischerboote reihen sich in Linien im Ostchinesischen Meer auf. Vieles spricht dafür, dass sie dort nicht fischen. Wir machen uns auf die Suche: Was haben sie dort gemacht - und hatte Chinas geheimnisvolle Fischermiliz etwas damit zu tun? rabbit hole hilft dir, Desinformation und KI-Fakes in deinem Feed zu durchschauen. Damit du schneller erkennst, was stimmt und was nicht. Denn zwischen viralen Clips, halben Wahrheiten und KI-Fakes wird es immer schwieriger, den Überblick zu behalten. Genau da setzt rabbit hole an. Dreimal im Monat auf unserem Kanal. @tagesschau

December 2025, January and March 2026: Hundreds of Chinese fishing boats line up in the East China Sea. There is strong evidence suggesting they aren't actually fishing there. We set out to investigate: What were they doing there—and did China’s mysterious fishing militia play a role? Rabbit hole helps you see through disinformation and AI-generated fakes in your feed, enabling you to quickly distinguish fact from fiction. After all, amidst viral clips, half-truths, and AI fakes, it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep track of what’s real. That’s exactly where rabbit hole comes in. Catch it three times a month on our channel. @tagesschau

Masahiro Yumino, a former Foreign Ministry analyst specializing in Chinese militias, says China maintains a “national defense mobilization” system that broadly incorporates citizens and resources.

Yumino said local People’s Armed Forces Departments oversee the maritime militia.

The Chinese government reported 8 million militia personnel nationwide in 2011. They have been deployed for public security in urban and rural areas, as well as disaster relief.

Yumino estimates the maritime militia component alone holds 200,000 to 300,000 members.

Their missions include deployment to disputed areas while posing as ordinary fishing vessels, coordination with Chinese coast guard ships, and obstruction or intimidation of foreign vessels.

It is believed that maritime militia members are sometimes ordered to collide with other ships.

Jason Wang, chief operating officer of the U.S.-based geospatial intelligence firm ingeniSPACE, which identified the post-December 2025 “wall” activities, said the maritime militia conducts intelligence gathering and patrols, serving as the “eyes and ears” of the Chinese military.

The “walls” of thousands of fishing vessels could block commercial shipping and effectively close sea lanes, he said.

“Activities of the Chinese maritime militia target not just Taiwan but also commercial shipping to Japan and South Korea,” Wang said.

These forces are trained for maritime interdiction and armed conflict scenarios, and could disrupt routes used by oil, LNG tankers and container ships.

Main Findings

• In August 2025, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted a large-scale exercise to simulate an invasion of Taiwan. This “capstone” amphibious exercise suggests that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) training and preparations for a future Taiwan campaign are becoming more focused, realistic, and sophisticated.

• The exercise consolidated elements from previous years into a single simulated operation. It integrated a floating causeway system, anti-landing barriers and obstacles, and amphibious Landing Craft Tank (LCT) vessels that landed forces directly onto beachheads.

• For the first time observed, the PLA conducted a phased exercise with simultaneous amphibious landings in three distinct locations. Exercise areas incorporated civilian aquaculture obstacles like those expected to be found along Taiwan’s coastline, increasing environmental and tactical realism.

• The exercise occurred at simulated “landing locations” opposite Taiwan, particularly within the Zhangzhou-Xiamen-Quanzhou littoral zone. The locations were distributed at distance intervals comparable to likely wartime beachheads along Taiwan’s western coastline. The total distance between discrete exercise locations was approximately 360 kilometers, roughly the distance between Taipei and Kaohsiung.

• Not merely hypothetical in nature, the exercise reflected a specific geographical and operational focus. It appears to be part of a larger trend whereby the PLA is mapping its exercises onto analogous geography that reflects envisioned targets.

• Future research should explore the potential applications and implications of PLA efforts to train with similar distances and geometries as would be found in prospective conflict zones.

• Starting this summer, observers should scrutinize future capstone amphibious exercises to better understand the PLA’s strengths, weaknesses, and underlying operational assumptions.

The geospatial firm ingeniSPACE first noticed the phenomenon, as 2,000 Chinese vessels created this formation from Dec. 25-27 in waters northeast of Taiwan.

This coordinated activity occurred just three days before China announced a major exercise circumscribing Taiwan. Dubbed Justice Mission-2025, the PLA exercise was designed to browbeat Taiwan and rehearse the implementation of a naval blockade.

Something similar took place from Jan. 9-12, when some 1,400 Chinese fishing boats formed a 200-mile-long “barrier” for more than 30 hours, according to automatic identification system data.

Surveying the Front Line of a Potential Conflict

Last February, a Chinese research ship named the Da Yang Hao sailed along Taiwan’s east coast, tracing a series of parallel lines over five days.

In the months that followed, five other Chinese research ships, including the Xiang Yang Hong 6, returned to the area, following similar routes. They often moved at slow speeds, typically 8 to 10 miles an hour, ideal for mapping undersea features using sonar and other techniques, a science known as bathymetry.