OP-ED: Securing Taiwan’s submarine cables - Taipei Times
By River Wan, Jason Wang, Elva Wu
China actively exploits Taiwan’s vulnerable submarine cables, posing a threat to the nation, from global stock trading to digital communications. Taiwan is not an isolated case. China’s “gray zone” warfare simultaneously threatens nearby states and diminishes regional stability as a whole. Submarine cables are Taiwan’s lifeline to regional allies, yet it does not have a dedicated unit to detect and deter hostile activities. The nation needs early warning capabilities to combat threats to vital infrastructure.
Distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) specifically addresses this challenge. DAS detects, classifies and tracks activity along the entire length of a cable by turning the cable itself into a sensor.
DAS can be understood as sensing the patterns of laser light sent through and scattered back through the cables. Any movement near the cable sends vibrations that disrupt the patterns of laser light pulses. If a ship drags its anchor across the seabed, this creates changes to light patterns detected by DAS, which pinpoints the exact location and nature of the activity.
Beyond vessel detection, it can be applied to other aspects, including monitoring offshore earthquakes and identifying cable faults. Its data can be used to generate actionable early warnings of impending threats, providing intelligence for deployment of law enforcement or a military response.
Frequency swept interrogation (FSI) DAS, one of the technology’s most significant developments since 1982, has been deployed in the Baltic Sea in the past decade to detect malicious cable cutting and ship activities. It has a crucial advantage over other DAS solutions — it is able to detect and GPS locate seabed disturbances, such as anchors or trawling activity 3km before it strikes a cable, without any need for automatic identification system satellites etc. This enables law enforcement to contact the offending vessel 15 to 20 minutes before it reaches the cable — perhaps not enough time to prevent deliberate damage, but sufficient to categorically prove deliberate intent and enable justified intervention.
FSI DAS could be likened to radar for the subsea — radar does not prevent air attacks, but it removes any possibility for aggressive “gray zone” activity by air or sea. For Taiwan, the significance of DAS is beyond its technical prowess. It signals willingness to defend the country and safeguard critical infrastructure.
However, technology alone is insufficient. To harness its full potential, three parallel efforts are needed to build Taiwan’s maritime domain awareness (MDA) capability.
First, establish a joint MDA intelligence network composed of related national security, coast guard and intelligence agencies. Establishing a common operation picture (COP) system is key for real-time information sharing to update the database for suspicious vessels and their pattern-of-life.
Second, invest in MDA technologies such as DAS, supported by vessel monitoring platforms that specialize in object recognition and machine-learning driven analysis. Furthermore, establish a watch floor linked to law and military assets using the COP system to coordinate interdiction on a continuous basis.
Lastly, engage in public education, raising the awareness and support that is necessary to build communications resiliency. More than 90 percent of Taiwan’s external communications travel through submarine cables; in wartime, a severed cable risks turning Taiwan into an isolated nation — a digital black box cut off from international support.
Intelligence is deterrence without provocation. When it comes to protecting Taiwan, maintaining the security of undersea assets through MDA is a critical decision. Taiwan has more than 14 cables connecting it to the outlying islands and to the rest of the world. It can transform these cables into a subsea radar that creates transparency, combats PLA irregular warfare and builds digital resiliency. Scaling systems across the Taiwan Strait is to integrate data for possible regional cooperation. Without a question, this is a whole-of-government opportunity.
At a fraction of the cost of a patrol vessel in capital and operating expenditure, DAS is not only a permanent and resilient technical solution, but also a diplomatic one, enabling Taiwan to take a proactive stance in this contested maritime space and to build partnerships across the first island chain.
River Wan is secretary-general of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, Republic of China Chapter. Jason Wang is a national security researcher and the chief operating officer of ingeniSPACE, a Silicon Valley geo-intelligence analytics house. Elva Wu is a national security researcher and all-source analyst at ingeniSPACE.